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1. Introduction	
	
Optimal	designs	of	both	public	policy	and	fundraising	mechanisms	rely	on	the	extent	to	which	charitable	
donations	are	motivated	by	altruism	and	warm‐glow.	Motives	for	giving	influence	donor	responses	to	
changes	 in	public	 funding	 for	projects,	and	 influence	the	effectiveness	of	a	wide	range	of	solicitation	
strategies,	such	as	the	characteristics	of	the	ask;	whether	past	donations	should	be	announced	to	future	
donors;	and	whether	a	charitable	lottery	is	likely	to	increase	the	funds	raised.		
	
To	 identify	 preferences	 for	 charitable	 giving	 researchers	 center	 on	measuring	how	much	 individual	
donations	respond	to,	or	are	crowded	out	by,	donations	by	others.		We	explore	this	central	crowd‐out	
test	and	demonstrate	that	it	is	not	well‐suited	for	identifying	preferences.	
	
The	theory	of	pure	altruism	assumes	that	the	sole	motive	for	charitable	giving	is	the	utility	derived	from	
the	charity’s	output	—	e.g.,	 from	children	 in	need	getting	aid	(Becker	1974).1	Such	altruistic	motives	
imply	that	gifts	are	valued	because	they	increase	the	charity’s	output,	and	that	donations	by	self	and	
others	are	seen	as	perfect	substitutes.	While	altruism	is	a	compelling	motive,	pure	altruism	implies	great	
responsiveness	to	donations	by	others,	and	in	turn	produces	extreme	predictions.	For	example,	a	one‐
dollar	 lump‐sum	 tax	 used	 to	 increase	 the	 charity’s	 output	 is	 predicted	 to	 decrease	 the	 donor’s	
contribution	 dollar‐for‐dollar,	 leaving	 the	 charity’s	 total	 output	 unchanged	 (Warr	 1982).	 Complete	
crowd‐out	is	a	testable	prediction	of	the	pure	altruism	model.2	
	
Andreoni	(1989)	suggested	that	in	addition	to	getting	utility	from	the	charity’s	output,	donors	also	get	
‘warm‐glow’	 from	 the	 act	 of	 giving.	Warm‐glow	 is	 a	 private	 benefit	 that	 is	 experienced	 only	 by	 the	
individual	contributing.	Motivated	by	both	altruism	and	warm‐glow,	the	impure	altruist	does	not	see	
donations	by	self	and	others	as	perfect	substitutes.	A	one‐dollar	increase	in	the	charity’s	output	financed	
by	a	lump‐sum	tax	does	not	produce	the	warm‐glow	of	a	voluntary	gift,	thus	in	response	the	impure	
altruist	decreases	her	own	gift	by	less	than	a	dollar,	in	turn	increasing	the	charity’s	total	output.	Less‐
than‐complete	crowd‐out	is	a	testable	prediction	of	the	impure	altruism	model.		
	
The	different	predictions	have	led	to	crowd‐out	becoming	the	central	test	when	identifying	motives:	the	
null	 hypothesis	 of	 pure	 altruism/complete	 crowd‐out	 is	 tested	 against	 the	 alternative	 of	 impure	
altruism/incomplete	crowd‐out.3	This	test	has	always	been	carried	out	around	one	level	of	the	charity’s	
                                                          
1	The	literature	on	motives	for	giving	can	be	seen	as	examining	the	supply	side	of	charitable	giving.	Significant	
research	has	also	been	done	on	the	demand	side	to	understand	the	mechanisms	fundraisers	use	to	solicit	funds	
(for	reviews	see	e.g.,	Andreoni	and	Payne,	2013;	List,	2011;	Vesterlund,	forthcoming).			
2	Andreoni	(1988),	Bergstrom,	Blume,	and	Varian	(1986),	and	Warr	(1983)	provide	additional	examples	of	the	
discrepancies	between	the	theoretical	predictions	of	the	pure	altruism	model	and	field	evidence.	For	reviews	of	
the	literature	on	crowd‐out,	see	Steinberg	(1991),	Khanna,	Posnett,	and	Sandler	(1995),	Kingma	(1989),	Okten	and	
Weisbrod	(2000),	Payne	(1998),	Ribar	and	Wilhelm	(2002),	and	Vesterlund	(2006).		
3	Recognizing	the	difficulty	associated	with	drawing	inference	on	motives	from	secondary	data,	recent	work	relies	
on	 experimental	 methods.	 Lab	 experiments	 eliminate	 fundraising	 responses	 to	 others’	 giving	 (Andreoni	 and	
Payne,	2011),	and	provides	the	needed	control	of	the	information	each	donor	has	about	the	level	of	others’	giving.	
Laboratory	studies	have	produced	a	wide	range	of	crowd‐out	estimates	from	zero	to	complete,	though	the	majority	
of	studies	find	less	than	complete	crowd‐out	and	reject	pure	altruism	(Andreoni	1993;	Bolton	and	Katok	1998;	
Chan,	Godby,	Mestelman,	and	Muller	2002;	Sutter	and	Weck‐Hannemann	2004;	Eckel,	Grossman,	and	Johnston	
2005;	Gronberg,	Luccasen,	Turocy,	and	Van	Huyck	2012).	
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output	 resulting	 in	 a	 single	 crowd‐out	 measurement.	 Although	 a	 single	 incomplete	 crowd‐out	
measurement	appears	indicative	of	the	degree	of	departure	from	pure	altruism,	and	of	the	weight	placed	
on	warm‐glow,	such	inference	is	not	correct.	Building	on	the	insights	of	Ribar	and	Wilhelm	(2002)	and	
Yildirim	(2014)	we	show	that	under	impure	altruism	the	degree	of	crowd‐out	is	sensitive	to	the	charity’s	
output	level.	Intuitively,	as	the	charity’s	output	increases,	the	marginal	utility	from	further	increasing	
output	 decreases,	 and	 so	 an	 impure	 altruist’s	 marginal	 motive	 for	 giving	 shifts	 away	 from	 being	
influenced	by	altruism	(the	benefit	of	increasing	output)	toward	being	influenced	by	warm‐glow	(the	
private	benefit	 of	making	 the	 gift).	 This	 shift	 in	marginal	motive	 toward	warm‐glow	decreases	how	
substitutable	donations	by	self	and	others	are,	and	in	turn	decreases	crowd‐out.	Thus,	for	a	given	set	of	
impurely	 altruistic	 preferences	 the	 degree	 of	 crowd‐out	 varies	 with	 the	 output	 level	 at	 which	 it	 is	
measured.		
	
The	sensitivity	to	the	charity’s	output	implies	that	a	single	crowd‐out	measurement	is	insufficient	for	
identifying	 preferences.	 First,	 the	 power	 to	 reject	 pure	 altruism/complete	 crowd‐out	 from	 a	 single	
crowd‐out	measurement	depends	on	the	output	level	where	it	is	measured.	Second,	because	crowd‐out	
varies,	 a	 single	measurement	 cannot	 identify	 altruism	 and	warm‐glow	preferences.	 Indeed,	 a	 single	
measurement	of	incomplete	crowd‐out	is	consistent	with	an	infinite	set	of	preferences,	ranging	from	
impure	altruism	in	which	altruism	plays	a	predominant	role	to	preferences	where	giving	is	motivated	
only	by	warm‐glow.However,	multiple	crowd‐out	measurements	around	different	levels	of	the	charity’s	
output	both	secure	identification	and	permit	a	new	test	of	the	impure	altruism	model:	namely	whether	
the	comparative	static	of	 the	 impure	altruism	model	—	that	crowd‐out	 is	decreasing	 in	the	charity’s	
output	—	is	supported	by	the	data.	
	
We	introduce	a	new	experimental	design	to	measure	crowd‐out	at	multiple	levels	of	output.	By	creating	
an	individualized	charity	for	each	participant,	our	design	controls	the	charity’s	exogenously	given	initial	
level	of	output.	Each	participant	is	paired	with	a	child	whose	house	has	suffered	extensive	fire	damage,	
and	the	participant	may	donate	money	to	purchase	books	for	the	child.	The	participant’s	donation	is	
added	to	an	exogenous	donation	by	a	foundation,	the	charity’s	initial	output	level,	and	the	sum	of	the	
two	is	used	to	purchase	books	for	the	child.	Book	donations	are	distributed	to	the	child	by	the	American	
Red	Cross	as	they	aid	the	family	immediately	after	the	fire.	The	foundation’s	exogenous	donation	is	the	
only	other	contribution	toward	books	for	the	child,	and	thus	the	participant	has	control	over	the	total	
and	final	amount	given.	By	controlling	the	charity’s	initial	output	level,	our	design	closely	captures	the	
theoretical	framework	used	to	model	charitable	giving.		
	
We	use	the	design	to	 	measure	crowd‐out	at	an	initially	 low	and	at	an	initially	high	output	 level	and	
provide	the	first	evidence	that	crowd‐out	depends	on	where	it	is	measured.	At	the	low	level	of	output	
we	find	essentially	complete	crowd	out,	while	crowd‐out	is	incomplete	at	the	high	level	of	output.	Had	
we	followed	the	literature	by	taking	only	one	crowd‐out	measurement,	and	had	that	one	measurement	
been	at	the	low	output	level,	we	would	have	concluded	that	donations	were	motivated	by	pure	altruism.	
If	instead	we	had	measured	crowd‐out	at	the	higher	output,	we	would	have	concluded	that	donations	
were	motivated	by	impure	altruism.	Thus,	the	power	to	reject	pure	altruism	depends	on	the	level	of	
output.		
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Measuring	crowd‐out	at	different	output	levels,	we	also	conduct	the	first	direct	test	of	impure	altruism.	
Finding	 that	 the	decrease	 in	 crowd‐out	 is	 statistically	 significant,	we	confirm	 the	novel	 comparative	
static	that	crowd‐out	decreases	as	the	charity’s	output	increases,	and	conclude	that	donations	in	our	
study	on	average	are	motivated	by	impure	altruism.		
	
Finally,	our	design	allows	inference	on	the	underlying	preferences.	Measuring	crowd‐out	and	income	
effects	at	different	output	 levels,	we	demonstrate	how	a	structural	model	of	 impure	altruism	can	be	
estimated	to	determine	altruism	and	warm‐glow	parameters.	We	estimate	both	representative‐agent	
and	 individual‐specific	 preferences,	 with	 the	 latter	 capturing	 the	 natural	 heterogeneity	 in	 motives	
across	individuals.	While	our	direct	test	of	impure	altruism	makes	it	possible	to	conclude	that	giving	is	
motivated	 both	 by	 altruism	 and	warm‐glow,	 the	 structural	 analysis	 is	 needed	 to	 assess	 the	 relative	
weight	placed	on	the	two	motives.		
	
2.	Theory	and	Background	
	
To	demonstrate	that	the	degree	of	crowd‐out	depends	on	the	charity’s	output	level,	we	follow	Becker	
(1974),	Bergstrom,	Blume,	and	Varian	(1986),	and	Andreoni	(1989,	1990)	in	reviewing	the	pure	and	
impure	altruism	models.		
	
In	the	pure	altruism	model,	individual	i	derives	utility	ܷሺݔ௜, ܩሻ	from	private	consumption	xi	and	from	
the	charity’s	output	G,	a	public	good.		Normalizing	prices,	i’s	budget	constraint	is	ݔ௜ ൅ ݃௜ ൑ ݓ௜,	where	gi	
is	her	gift	to	the	charity	and	wi	is	her	income.	ܩ ൌ ∑ ݃௜௡௜ୀଵ 	denotes	the	sum	of	the	individual	gifts,	and	
ܩି௜ ൌ ∑ ݃௝௝ஷ௜ 	the	amount	given	by	others.	Assuming	that	ܷሺ∙,∙ሻ	is	continuous	and	strictly	quasi‐concave,	
i’s	preferred	level	of	the	charity’s	output	is	given	by	the	continuous	demand	function	G*	=	q	(wi	+	G‐i).	A	
pure	altruist’s	preferred	charity	output,	G*,	only	depends	on	her	social	income,	Zi	≡	wi	+	G‐i.	Capturing	
that	donations	by	self	and	others	are	perfect	substitutes	the	‘income’	effects	with	respect	to	own	income	
and	giving‐by‐others	are	equal:	dG*/dwi	=	dG*/dG‐i		≜		q1.4	An	increase	in	giving‐by‐others,	that	is	funded	
through	a	lump‐sum	tax	on	i	(dGi=‐	dwi)	will	change	the	composition	but	not	the	level	of	social	income,	
and	leave	unchanged	i’s	preferred	charity	output.		i’s	response	to	the	tax	funded	increase	in	giving‐by‐
others	 is	 a	 one‐for‐one	 decrease	 in	 her	 contribution	 and	 crowd‐out	 is	 predicted	 to	 be	
complete	 ୢ௚೔∗ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀିௗீష೔ ൌ െ1.		
	
Responding	 to	 substantial	 empirical	 evidence	 of	 less	 than	 complete	 crowd‐out,	 Andreoni	 (1989)	
proposed	instead	that	individuals	benefit	both	from	the	increase	in	output	and	from	the	act	of	giving.5		
Such	impurely	altruistic	individuals	have	preferences	of	the	form	ܷሺݔ௜, ܩ, ݃௜ሻ,	where	i’s	gift,	݃௜,	affects	
utility	both	from	increasing	output	G,	and	from	generating	a	private	warm‐glow	benefit,	݃௜.	In	adding	
warm‐glow,	the	demand	for	the	charity’s	output	is	now	a	function	of	two	arguments,	social	income	and	
                                                          
4	This	statement	holds	provided	i’s	gift	is	strictly	positive.	Bergstrom,	Blume,	and	Varian	(1986)	examine	altruistic	
giving	when	some	individuals	are	at	corner	solutions	gi*	=	0.	
5	See	also	Cornes	and	Sandler	(1984)	and	Steinberg	(1987).	
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giving‐by‐others:	ܩ∗ ൌ ݍሺݓ௜ ൅ ܩି௜, ܩି௜ሻ.6	Donations	by	self	and	others	are	no	longer	perfect	substitutes,	
and	the	‘income’	effects	with	respect	to	own	income	dG*/dwi	≜	q1	and	giving‐by‐others	dG*/dG‐i	≜	q1	+	
q2	are	no	longer	equal.	Assuming	that	warm‐glow	is	a	normal	good,	q2	>	0,	the	individual’s	desired	charity	
output	 increases	more	 in	 response	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 giving‐by‐others	 (dG‐i)	 than	 in	 response	 to	 an	
increase	in	income	(dwi);	q2	is	the	difference	between	the	two	income	effects	=	dG*/dG‐i		−		dG*/dwi.	
	
The	impure	altruism	model	reduces	to	pure	altruism	if	q1	>	0	and	q2	=	0.	Pure	warm‐glow	implies	that	
giving‐by‐others	does	not	affect	 the	 individual’s	contribution,	causing	 i’s	preferred	 level	of	output	 to	
increase	dollar‐for‐dollar	with	an	increase	in	giving‐by‐others:		dܩ∗/dܩି௜|ௗ௪೔ୀ଴ ൌ	q1	+	q2	=	1.	Finally	if	
q1	>	0,	q2	>	0	and	q1	+	q2	<	1,	then	both	altruism	and	warm‐glow	influence	giving.		
	
Importantly,	incomplete	crowd‐out	is	predicted	by	the	impure	altruism	model.	A	one	dollar	lump‐sum	
tax	accompanied	by	a	one	dollar	increase	in	the	giving‐by‐others	(dG‐i	=െ	dwi	=1)	increases	i’s	preferred	
output	level	by	q2		>	0,	securing	less	than	complete	crowd‐out:	d݃௜∗/dܩି௜|ௗ௪೔ୀିௗீష೔ ൌ െ1 ൅ ݍଶ.		
	
In	testing	motives	for	giving,	researchers	hold	the	complete	crowd‐out	prediction	of	pure	altruism	as	
the	 null	 hypothesis	 (H0:	 หd݃௜∗/dܩି௜|ௗ௪೔ୀିௗீష೔ห	 =	 1).	 For	 example,	 Bolton	 and	 Katok	 (1998)	 look	 at	
transfers	in	two	dictator	game	treatments	to	measure	crowd‐out.	In	one	treatment,	the	decision	maker	
has	an	endowment	of	$18	and	the	recipient	has	$2;	in	another	treatment,	the	decision	maker	has	$15	
and	the	recipient	has	$5.	Seeing	the	recipient’s	earnings	as	the	charitable	output,	crowd‐out	is	measured	
at	ܩି௜ ൌ $2,	with	݀ܩି௜ ൌ 	െ݀ݓ௜ ൌ $3.	Bolton	and	Katok	find	that	—	in	contrast	to	the	prediction	by	pure	
altruism	—	transfers	in	the	second	treatment	are	not	$3	lower	than	in	the	first.	Instead,	crowd‐out	is	
found	to	be	incomplete	(หd݃௜∗/dܩି௜|ௗ௪೔ୀିௗீష೔ห	=	.737),	and	they	conclude	that	individuals	are	impurely	
altruistic.	Other	experiments	also	measure	crowd‐out	at	a	single	level	of	giving‐by‐others	and	produce	
a	wide	range	of	crowd‐out	estimates.	Most	reject	pure	altruism.7	
	
However,	a	single	measure	of	crowd‐out	is	insufficient	for	determining	the	extent	to	which	preferences	
deviate	 from	 pure	 altruism.	 To	 demonstrate,	 consider	 the	 Cobb‐Douglas	 impure	 altruism	 utility	
function:			
U(xi,	G,	gi)			=			(1	−	α	−	β)	ln	xi		+		α	ln	G		+		β	ln	gi.	 	 	 (1)	
	
                                                          
6	While	the	first	order	condition	of	a	pure	altruist	is		െܷ௫ሺݔ௜, ܩሻ ൅ ܷீሺݔ௜, ܩሻ ൌ 0,	that	of	an	impure	altruist	adds	a	
second	 marginal‐benefit‐of‐giving	 term,	 i.e.,	 െܷ௫ሺݔ௜, ܩ, ܩ െ ܩି௜ሻ ൅ ܷீሺݔ௜, ܩ, ܩ െ ܩି௜ሻ ൅ ௚ܷ೔ሺݔ௜, ܩ, ܩ െ ܩି௜ሻ ൌ 0,	
when	using	݃௜ ൌ ܩ െ ܩ௜.	
7	Andreoni	(1993)	finds	0.715	crowd‐out,	and	rejects	pure	altruism.	Gronberg,	Luccasen,	Turocy,	and	Van	Huyck	
(2012)	obtain	a	larger	crowd‐out	(0.90),	but	still	reject	pure	altruism.	Eckel,	Grossman,	and	Johnston	(2005)	obtain	
zero	crowd‐out	or	complete	crowd‐out	depending	on	how	the	lump‐sum	taxation	is	framed,	and	interpret	their	
results	as	supporting	pure	warm‐glow.	Sutter	and	Weck‐Hannemann	(2004)	replicate	Andreoni	(1993),	but	obtain	
complete	crowd‐out	and	therefore	cannot	reject	pure	altruism.	Chan,	Godby,	Mestelman,	and	Muller	(2002)	also	
replicate	Andreoni	(1993)	but	take	two	crowd‐out	measurements	around	a	single	(low)	level	of	giving‐by‐others;	
one	measure	moves	to	the	left	and	the	other	moves	to	the	right	(akin	to	a	left	and	right	derivative)	yielding	crowd‐
out	 measurements	 that	 are	 not	 significantly	 different	 (one	 is	 complete,	 the	 other	 is	 similar	 to	 Andreoni’s).		
Experiments	 using	 the	 linear	 voluntary	 contribution	 mechanism	 have	 produced	 a	 similar	 range	 of	 results	
(Anderson,	Goeree	and	Holt	1998;	Goeree,	Holt	and	Laury	2002;	Palfrey	and	Prisbrey	1996,	1997).		
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The	difficulty	in	inferring	preferences	from	one	crowd‐out	measurement	is	seen	in	Figure	1.	For	three	
different	sets	of	parameters,	we	show	how	crowd‐out	varies	with	output,	or	more	precisely	with	the	
amount	given	by	others	(G‐i).		Looking	first	at	the	bold	line	where	α	=	.40	and	β	=	.10,	we	see	that	crowd‐
out	depends	on	where	 it	 is	measured.	 Crowd‐out	decreases	when	 it	 is	measured	 at	 higher	 levels	 of	
output.	When	measured	at	a	low	level	of	output	the	marginal	utility	to	further	increasing	output	is	high,	
and	the	degree	of	crowd‐out	is	close	to	complete,	suggesting	that	altruism	strongly	affects	the	marginal	
motive	for	giving.	However,	as	output	increases,	the	marginal	utility	from	output	decreases,	the	marginal	
motive	shifts	toward	warm‐glow,	and	crowd‐out	decreases.	As	output	increases	the	marginal	motive	for	
giving	 (governed	 by	 q1	 and	 q2)	 shifts	 away	 from	 being	 influenced	 by	 altruism	 (α)	 toward	 being	
influenced	by	warm‐glow	(β).		This	sensitivity	to	output,	or	giving‐by‐others,	implies	that	under	impure	
altruism	the	power	to	reject	pure	altruism	depends	on	where	crowd‐out	is	measured.	
	
Figure	1.	Crowd‐out	as	a	function	of	giving‐by‐others.	
	
Second,	 to	 see	 that	 measuring	 crowd‐out	 around	 a	 single	 output	 level	 cannot	 identify	 the	 relative	
strengths	 of	 altruism	 and	 warm‐glow	 preferences,	 consider	 a	 study	 that	 finds	 a	 single	 crowd‐out	
measurement	of	80	percent	when	the	amount	given	by	others	equals	$10	(=	G‐i).	Figure	1	shows	that	
this	measurement	of	crowd‐out	is	consistent	with	α	=	.40,	β	=	.10,	where	preferences	place	less	weight	
on	warm‐glow	than	altruism.8	However	an	80	percent	crowd‐out	at	G‐i	=	$10	 is	also	consistent	with	
preferences	where	the	relative	weight	on	warm‐glow	is	much	smaller	or	substantially	larger	(e.g.,	(α	=	
.27,	β	=	.01)	or	(α	=	.35,	β	=	.35),	respectively).	In	fact,	there	are	infinitely	many	α,	β	parameterizations	
that	generate	 this	one	crowd‐out	measurement.	Thus,	 the	 relative	weight	placed	on	warm‐glow	and	
altruism	cannot	be	identified	from	a	single	crowd‐out	measurement.	In	addition,	we	cannot	use	a	single	
measurement	of	incomplete	crowd	to	infer	that	individuals	are	impurely	altruistic	because	a	model	of	
pure	warm‐glow	(α	=	0,	β	=	.80)	also	generates	an	80	percent	crowd‐out.	While	this	single	crowd‐out	
                                                          
8	The	weight	on	warm‐glow,	β,	relative	to	overall	generosity,	α+β,	is	0.2	(=β/α+β).	
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measurement	makes	it	possible	to	reject	the	pure	altruism	null,	such	rejection	does	not	imply	acceptance	
of	any	specific	alternative.		
	
Finally,	measuring	crowd‐out	at	multiple	output	levels	allows	a	new	test	of	impure	altruism:	decreasing	
crowd‐out.	Figure	1	shows	that	decreasing	crowd‐out	holds	for	Cobb‐Douglas	preferences,	and	Ribar	
and	Wilhelm	(2002)	show	that	this	comparative	static	holds	asymptotically	for	preferences	in	general.	
Separability	and	mild	restrictions	on	preferences	secure	that	the	decrease	in	crowd‐out	is	monotonic,	
thus	producing	a	direct	and	novel	test	of	the	impure	altruism	model	(proofs	are	shown	in	Appendix	A).9	
The	test	is	direct	because	impure	altruism	is	positioned	as	the	null	hypothesis	and	novel	because	it	tests	
a	prediction	for	which	there	did	not	exist	supporting	evidence	at	the	time	the	theory	was	proposed.	10	
	
In	 the	 next	 section,	we	 introduce	 a	 new	 experimental	 design	 that	 controls	 the	 charity’s	 output	 and	
measures	crowd‐out	at	two	output	levels.	That	is,	we	vary	the	level	of	giving‐by‐others	and	measure	
crowd‐out	at	two	levels	of	G‐i:	a	low	and	a	high	level.	We	use	these	crowd‐out	measurements	to	both	
demonstrate	 that	 rejection	 of	 pure	 altruism	depends	 on	where	 the	 hypothesis	 is	 tested,	 and	 to	 test	
impure	altruism’s	decreasing	crowd‐out	prediction.	Eliciting	contributions	across	six	different	budgets,	
we	 identify	crowd‐out	and	the	associated	own‐income	effects,	which	 in	 turn	allow	us	 to	structurally	
estimate	the	relative	weights	placed	on	altruism	and	warm‐glow.		
	
3.		Experimental	Design	
	
	The	experimental	design	mirrors	the	theory	by	strictly	controlling	the	level	of	giving‐by‐others	so	that	
each	 participant’s	 gift	 determines	 the	 final	 and	 total	 output	 for	 an	 “individualized”	 charity.	 We	
collaborated	with	a	chapter	of	the	American	Red	Cross	to	give	participants	the	opportunity	to	help	a	
child	in	need	in	a	way	no	one	outside	the	experiment	was	doing.	Specifically,	in	the	event	of	a	fire,	the	
chapter	 helps	 affected	 families	 find	 temporary	 shelter	 and	 provides	 them	 with	 clothing,	 essential	
                                                          
9	Ribar	and	Wilhelm	(2002)	show	under	weak	conditions	on	preferences	(concave	utility	and	strictly	operative	
warm‐glow	at	all	levels	of	G)	that	an	impure	altruism	model	converges	to	a	model	where,	at	the	margin,	giving	is	
motivated	only	by	warm‐glow:	G‐i	→	∞	⇒	q1	+	q2	→	1.	Appendix	A	examines	the	conditions	sufϐicient	to	secure	that	
the	associated	decrease	in	crowd‐out	is	monotonic.	First,	crowd‐out	decreases	monotonically	if	utility	is	additively	
separable	with	positive	third	derivatives.	Cobb‐Douglas	preferences	meet	these	conditions,	thus	generating	the	
decreasing	crowd‐outs	shown	in	Figure	1.	Second,	with	Cobb‐Douglas	preferences	and	holding	income	constant,	
an	individual’s	contribution	becomes	less	sensitive	to	an	increase	in	giving‐by‐others	(“unfunded”	crowd‐out)	the	
higher	 the	 initial	 level	 of	 giving‐by‐others.	 The	marginal	motive	 for	 giving	monotonically	moves	 from	 impure	
altruism	to	pure	warm‐glow	(ݍଵ ൅	ݍଶ → 1	).	Third,	we	present	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	separable	impure	 altruism	 utility	 functions	 to	 have	 monotonically	 decreasing	 unfunded	 crowd‐out.	 Appendix	 A	
demonstrates	 that	a	 test	of	 impure	altruism’s	decreasing	crowd‐out	prediction	must	be	conducted	 jointly	with	
some	restrictions	on	preferences.	We	offer	three	perspectives.	First,	absent	restrictions,	the	impure	altruism	model	
is	void	of	testable	predictions,	other	than	the	assumption	that	q2	>	0.	Second,	previous	empirical	and	experimental	
analyses	 of	 the	 impure	 altruism	 model	 assume	 separability	 (see	 e.g.,	 Andreoni	 1990,	 1993;	 Chan,	 Godby,	
Mestelman,	and	Muller	2002;	Gronberg,	Luccasen,	Turocy,	and	Van	Huyck	2012;	Sutter	and	Weck‐Hannemann	
2004).	Third,	beyond	some	level	of	G‐i,	monotonically	decreasing	crowd‐out	becomes	applicable	to	non‐separable	
impurely	altruistic	utility	functions.	As	G‐i	→	∞	these	utility	functions	become	asymptotically	separable,	i.e.,	UgG	→	
0	and	UxG	→	0	(Ribar	and	Wilhelm,	2002).		
10	According	to	some,	though	not	all,	theories	of	confirmation,	confirmation	of	a	novel	prediction	provides	stronger	
support	for	a	theory	(e.g.,	Musgrave,	1974).		
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toiletries,	and	a	meal.	We	joined	with	the	chapter	to	collect	funds	to	buy	books	for	the	affected	children.	
Prior	to	our	study	no	items	were	given	to	the	children	affected	by	the	fire.11		
	
Each	participant	in	the	study	was	paired	with	a	child	(1‐12	years	old)	whose	family	home	had	suffered	
extensive	 fire	 damage.	 Each	 participant	was	 given	 an	 endowment	 and	 asked	 to	 allocate	 it	 between	
herself	and	the	child.	They	were	told	that	in	addition	to	their	donation,	a	research	foundation	would	
donate	a	fixed	amount	of	money	towards	the	child;	this	is	the	individualized	charity’s	initial	output	level.	
The	foundation’s	donation	was	independent	of	the	participant’s	allocation,	and	the	total	amount	to	be	
spent	on	books	for	the	child	would	be	the	sum	of	the	individual’s	donation	and	the	foundation’s	donation.	
The	books	would	be	given	to	the	child	by	the	Red	Cross	immediately	after	the	child	had	been	affected	by	
a	fire.		Participants	knew	that:	“Each	participant	in	this	study	is	paired	with	a	different	child	.	.	.	Only	you	
have	the	opportunity	to	allocate	additional	funds	[additional	to	the	foundation’s	fixed	donation]	to	the	
child.	Neither	the	American	Red	Cross	nor	any	other	donors	provide	books	to	the	child.”	
	
Building	on	Andreoni	 and	Miller	 (2002)	and	Fisman	et	 al.	 (2007)	we	use	a	within‐subject	design	 to	
identify	 individual	 preferences.12	 Each	 participant	 faced	 six	 budgets	 received	 in	 one	 of	 six	 random	
orders.	The	six	budgets	are	summarized	in	Table	1.	Each	budget	indicated	the	participant’s	endowment,	
ݓ௜,	and	the	foundation’s	fixed	donation,	ܩି௜.	For	each	budget,	the	participant	was	free	to	give	any	portion	
of	 the	 endowment	 to	 the	 child,	݃௜.	 For	 example	 for	 Budget	 1	 the	 participant	was	 informed	 that	 the	
foundation	would	donate	$4	toward	books	for	the	child,	and	that	the	participant	had	an	endowment	of	
$40	that	she	could	allocate	between	herself	and	the	child.	Any	amount	allocated	to	the	child	would	be	
added	to	the	$4	foundation	donation	and	the	sum	of	funds	used	to	buy	books	ሺܩ∗ ൌ ܩି௜ ൅ ݃௜)	for	the	
child.13	One	randomly	selected	decision	was	carried	out	for	payment.	
	
	 	
                                                          
11	 Donations	were	made	 immediately	 after	 the	 fire	 along	with	 the	 Southwestern	 Pennsylvania	 chapter	 of	 the	
American	Red	Cross’	transfer	of	other	provisions.	In	explaining	why	the	Red	Cross	was	seeking	the	participant’s	
contribution	for	books,	participants	were	informed	that	the	chapter’s	Emergency	Preparedness	Coordinator	Sandi	
Wraith	had	made	the	following	statement:	“Children’s	needs	are	often	overlooked	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	a	
disaster	because	everyone	is	concerned	primarily	with	putting	the	fire	out,	reaching	safety,	and	finding	shelter,	
food	and	clothing...just	the	basics	of	life.	So	many	times,	I've	seen	children	just	sitting	on	the	curb	with	no	one	to	
talk	to	about	what's	happening...for	this	reason	I've	found	trauma	recovery	experts	in	the	community	to	work	with	
us	to	train	our	volunteer	responders	in	how	to	address	children's	needs	at	the	scene	of	a	disaster...being	able	to	
give	the	children	fun,	distracting	books	will	provide	a	great	bridge	for	our	volunteers	to	connect	with	kids	and	get	
them	talking	about	what	they've	experienced.”	
12	The	objective	of	these	studies	is	to	determine	whether	giving	is	consistent	with	GARP	and	whether	choices	can	
be	 rationalized	 by	 altruistic	 preferences.	 Using	 the	 within‐subject	 variation,	 both	 studies	 point	 to	 individual	
heterogeneity	and	estimate	pure	altruism	preferences	(CES).	Identification	of	individual	preferences	requires	a	
within‐subject	 design.	 Empirically	 there	 is	 limited	 evidence	 that	 such	 elicitation	 influences	 average	 choices.	
Theoretically	 in	 paying	 for	 only	 one	 decision	 identification	 is	 not	 compromised	 by	 risk	 aversion	 provided	
participants	 are	 assumed	 to	maximize	 expected	 utility.	 See	 Azrieli,	 Chambers	 and	Healy	 (2015)	 for	 the	much	
weaker	condition	under	which	such	random	problem	selection	(RPS)	mechanisms	are	incentive	compatible.	
13	While	there	effectively	are	only	two	contributors	(participant	and	foundation)	to	the	charitable	output	(books	
for	one	child)	the	increase	in	giving‐by‐others/foundation	mimics	the	effect	of	increasing	the	set	of	donors.	
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Table	1:	Experimental	budgets.	
Budget	
Foundation’s	
fixed	donation
(G‐i)	
Participant’s	
endowment	
(wi)	
Participant’s		
social	income	
(G‐i	+	wi)	
1	 4	 40	 44	
2	 10	 40	 50	
3	 28	 40	 68	
4	 34	 40	 74	
5	 4	 46	 50	
6	 28	 46	 74	
	
The	six	budgets	in	Table	1	allow	us	to	examine	the	participant’s	demand	for	giving	books	to	the	child	
and	the	motives	for	such	giving.		Budgets	5	and	2	measure	crowd‐out	at	a	low	level	of	output	(ܩି௜ 	=	4).	
Holding	social	income	(G‐i	+	wi)	constant	at	$50,	the	two	budgets	capture	the	effect	of	a	$6	increase	in	
output	 funded	 through	 a	 $6	 lump‐sum	 tax.	 Similarly,	measured	 at	 the	 high	 output	 level	 (ܩି௜ 	=	 28)	
Budgets	6	and	4	hold	social	income	constant	at	$74,	capturing	the	effect	of	the	same	$6	balanced‐budget	
increase	in	output.	Hence,	we	measure	crowd‐out	(d݃௜∗/dܩି௜|ௗ௪೔ୀିௗீష೔ ൌ 	െ1൅ݍଶ)	at	a	low	and	at	a	high	
level	of	output.	Furthermore,	comparing	Budgets	1	and	5	and	Budgets	3	and	6	allow	for	measurement	
of	own	income	effects	(d݃௜∗/dݓ௜ ൌq1)	at	low	and	high	levels	of	output,	respectively.	Finally,	to	assess	the	
extent	to	which	the	marginal	motive	for	giving	shifts	toward	warm‐glow,	we	can	use	Budgets	1	and	2,	
and	then	3	and	4,	to	hold	own	income	constant	and	determine	whether,	between	the	low	and	high	output	
levels,	there	is	a	change	in	how	participants	respond	to	an	increase	in	output	that	is	not	funded	by	a	
corresponding	lump‐sum	tax—so‐called	“unfunded”	crowd‐out:	d݃௜∗/dܩି௜|ௗ௪೔ୀ଴ ൌ െ1൅ݍଵ ൅ ݍଶ.	Recall	
that	 under	 pure	 warm‐glow,	 giving‐by‐others	 has	 no	 effect	 on	 the	 individual’s	 contribution,	 hence	
unfunded	crowd‐out	equals	zero:		d݃௜∗/dܩି௜|ௗ௪೔ୀ଴ ൌ 0,	with	ݍଵ ൅ ݍଶ ൌ 1.	Measuring	unfunded	crowd‐
out	at	 low	and	high	output	 levels	we	can	determine	whether	warm‐glow	becomes	a	relatively	more	
important	motive	at	the	margin	—	whether	ݍଵ ൅ ݍଶ	gets	closer	to	1	—	when	output	increases.14		
	
The	procedures	of	the	experiment	were	as	 follows.	A	total	of	85	undergraduates	at	the	University	of	
Pittsburgh	participated	in	one	of	six	sessions.	Participants	were	seated	in	a	large	classroom	and	given	a	
folder	with	a	set	of	instructions,	a	quiz,	an	envelope,	a	calculator,	and	a	pen.		Participants	were	asked	to	
take	out	the	instructions	and	to	follow	along	as	these	were	read	out	loud.	They	were	then	given	a	brief	
quiz	to	make	sure	that	they	could	calculate	the	payoffs	of	a	sample	decision.	The	quiz	was	collected	and	
participants	 given	 answers	 to	 the	 quiz.	 These	 answers	were	 carefully	 reviewed	 before	 participants	
proceeded	to	the	decision	task.	Using	pen	and	paper,	participants	made	contribution	decisions	for	each	
of	the	six	budgets.	When	all	decision	forms	were	collected,	a	number	between	1	and	6	was	drawn	to	
determine	 which	 decision	 would	 be	 implemented.	 Payments	 were	 prepared	 while	 participants	
completed	a	questionnaire.		
	
                                                          
14	A	pure	altruist	gives	to	influence	the	output,	in	this	case	the	gift	received,	say	moving	from	cheap	scholastic	paper	
backs	to	hardbound	colorful	picture	books.	A	pure	warm‐glow	giver	is	not	influenced	by	altering	the	gift	received;	
for	example	it	may	be	someone	who	feels	guilty	unless	a	certain	percentage	of	income	is	donated.	With	the	motive	
being	to	assuage	guilt,	the	donation	is	independent	of	the	gift	received	by	the	child.		
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The	study	was	double‐blind.	Each	decision	form	was	identified	only	by	a	claim	check	number,	and	this	
number	was	used	for	the	participant’s	anonymous	payment.	However,	participants	had	the	option	of	
relinquishing	 their	 anonymity	 if	 they	wanted	 to	 receive	 an	 acknowledgement	directly	 from	 the	Red	
Cross.	Once	the	decision	task	was	completed,	the	participant	placed	the	decision	form	in	the	envelope.	
From	 that	 point	 onward,	 decisions	were	 identified	 only	 by	 a	 claim	 check	 number.	While	 one	 set	 of	
experimenters	placed	the	participants’	payments	in	sealed	envelopes,	another	experimenter,	who	did	
not	oversee	the	payment,	distributed	the	envelopes	by	claim	check	number.	
	
To	 assure	 participants	 that	 the	 experimental	 procedures	 were	 followed,	 we	 used	 a	 verification	
procedure	 similar	 to	 Eckel	 et	 al.	 (2005).	 During	 the	 instruction	 phase	 we	 randomly	 selected	 one	
participant	to	be	a	monitor.	The	monitor	oversaw	all	procedures	of	the	experiment,	and	reported	to	the	
participants	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 experiment	whether	 the	 experimenters	 had	 followed	 the	 procedures	
described	in	the	instructions.	Participants	were	also,	from	a	distance,	shown	the	acknowledgements	and	
checks	that	were	to	be	sent	to	the	Red	Cross.	Once	the	participants	had	received	their	payment	and	left	
the	study,	the	monitor	walked	with	the	experimenter	to	mail	the	envelopes	with	the	checks	to	the	Red	
Cross,	the	monitor	signed	a	statement	to	certify	that	all	procedures	had	been	followed,	and	the	statement	
along	with	a	receipt	for	donations	were	posted	in	the	Economics	Department.	At	the	request	of	the	Red	
Cross,	 the	experimenters	handled	the	purchase	of	books.	For	each	participant	 in	 the	experiment,	we	
ordered	three	books	of	values	corresponding	to	the	total	amount	donated	on	the	selected	decision	and	
packaged	the	purchased	books	in	an	individual	gift	bag.	
	
4.	Results	 	 	 	
	
Participants	found	the	charitable	cause	worthy	of	donations.	Average	giving	across	the	six	budgets	(6	x	
85	=	510	decisions)	was	$20.82	with	a	standard	deviation	of	$12.11,	indicating	substantial	individual	
variation.	One	participant	never	contributed	while	five	participants	contributed	the	entire	endowment	
for	each	of	the	six	budgets.			
	 	
4.1.	Reduced‐form	measures	of	crowd‐out:	Altruism	vs.	Impure	Altruism		
	
Table	 2	 presents	 the	 crowd‐out	 estimates.	 Using	 a	 linear	 regression	 with	 individual	 fixed‐effects,	
columns	1	and	2	report	crowd‐out	estimates	at	low	and	high	levels	of	output,	respectively.	Starting	at	
the	low	level	of	giving‐by‐others	($4)	we	see	a	94	percent	crowd‐out	(column	1).	That	is,	every	dollar	
increase	in	giving‐by‐others	from	$4	to	$10	—	while	at	the	same	time	decreasing	own	income	from	$46	
to	$40,	ensuring	budget	balance	—	caused	a	$0.94	reduction	in	the	participants’	contribution.	Consistent	
with	 pure	 altruism,	 we	 cannot	 reject	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 this	 degree	 of	 crowd‐out	 is	 complete	
(H0:│d݃௜∗/dܩି௜|ௗ௪೔ୀିௗீష೔│≥	1	has	p	=	.255).	Had	we	followed	the	procedures	of	previous	experiments	
and	 examined	 only	 one	 crowd‐out	 measurement,	 this	 result	 would	 have	 led	 us	 to	 conclude	 that	
donations	were	motivated	by	pure	altruism.	
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Table	2.	Change	in	crowd‐out	between	a	low	and	a	high	level	of	giving‐by‐others.	
	 Crowd‐out	
( ୢ௚೔∗ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀିௗீష೔ሻ	
	 Unfunded	
crowd‐out	
( ୢ௚೔∗ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀ଴ሻ	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Linear	model	 	 Accounting	for	corner	decisions	
	 	 	 	
	 Giving‐by‐others		 	 Giving‐by‐others	
	 Low	
(1)	
High	
(2)	
	 Low	
(3)	
High	
(4)	
Low/High	
(5)	
	 Low/High	
(6)	
Giving‐by‐others		
(G‐i)	
‐0.94	a	
(0.09)	
‐0.77	b	
(0.08)	
	 ‐0.97	c	
(0.09)	
‐0.82	d	
(0.09)	
‐0.99	e	
(0.09)	
	 ‐0.64	
(0.08)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Giving‐by‐others	⨯					
High	interaction	
‐	 ‐	 	 ‐	 ‐	 0.18	f	
(0.12)	
	 	0.22	g	
(0.09)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Budgets:	G‐i,	wi	 		$4,	$46	
$10,	$40	
	
	
$28,	$46	
$34,	$40	
	
	 $4,	$46	
$10,	$40	
	
$28,	$46	
$34,	$40	
	
		$4,	$46	
$10,	$40	
$28,	$46	
$34,	$40	
	 		$4,	$40	
$10,	$40	
$28,	$40	
$34,	$40	
Notes:	The	dependent	variable	is	the	number	of	dollars	a	participant	contributes.	The	estimates	in	columns	1	and	
2	are	from	linear	regressions	with	individual	fixed	effects.	The	estimates	in	columns	3–6	are	marginal	effects	
from	the	two‐side	estimator	by	Alan,	Honoré,	Hu,	and	Leth‐Petersen	(2014)	that	accounts	for	the	corner	
solutions	at	$0	and	$40	or	$46	with	individual	fixed	effects.		Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses	and	are	
bootstrapped	in	columns	3–6.	N	=	85	participants.		Tests	of	complete	crowd‐out	have	p‐values:	a	p	=	0.255,		b	p	=	
0.002,	c	p	=	0.390,		d	p	=	0.034,	and	e	p	=	0.477.	f	Test	of	no	decrease	in	crowd‐out	has	p	=	0.07.	g	Test	of	no	
decrease	in	unfunded	crowd‐out	has	p	=	0.013.	
	
The	inference	on	motives	would,	however,	be	different	if	instead	we	measured	crowd‐out	at	a	high	level	
of	giving‐by‐others	(i.e.,	$28).	Column	2	shows	that	in	this	case	crowd‐out	is	77	percent,	and	we	easily	
reject	complete	crowd‐out	(p	=	0.002).	Had	we	only	measured	crowd‐out	at	this	high	output	level	we	
would	conclude	that	donations	were	motivated	by	impure	altruism.	This	is	the	first	empirical	evidence	
that	crowd‐out	depends	on	the	output	 level	where	 it	 is	measured,	and	that	the	power	to	reject	pure	
altruism	depends	on	where	the	hypothesis	is	tested.	
	
The	results	in	columns	1	and	2	however	do	not	take	into	account	that	12.5	percent	of	decisions	involved	
a	contribution	of	none	or	all	of	the	individual’s	endowment.	In	failing	to	account	for	these	corners	the	
results	are	biased	against	pure	altruism.	We	therefore	re‐estimate	the	models	taking	into	account	corner	
decisions.	Using	the	two‐sided	individual	fixed	effects	censored	estimator	of	Alan,	Honoré,	Hu,	and	Leth‐
Petersen	 (2014)	 the	 crowd‐out	 estimates	 reported	 in	 columns	3	 and	4	 reveal	 that	 indeed	 failure	 to	
account	for	corners	biases	the	results	against	pure	altruism:	both	crowd‐out	estimates	increase.	The	
qualitative	conclusions	however	remain.	At	the	low	level	of	giving‐by‐others,	crowd‐out	is	97	percent	
and	we	cannot	reject	that	it	is	complete.	At	the	high	level,	crowd‐out	is	82	percent	and	we	can	reject	that	
it	is	complete	(p	=	0.034).		
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The	estimates	in	columns	3	and	4	suggest	that,	consistent	with	the	new	test	of	impure	altruism,	crowd‐
out	is	decreasing	in	the	level	of	output.	Column	5	conducts	this	test	by	combining	the	two	sets	of	data.	
An	interaction	term	is	included	to	indicate	when	the	data	are	from	the	budgets	where	giving‐by‐others	
is	high.	Consistent	with	 impure	altruism,	we	 find	 that	 crowd‐out	decreases	by	18	percentage	points	
going	from	the	low	to	high	level	of	giving‐by‐others.	To	assess	the	strength	of	the	evidence,	we	test	the	
opposite	hypothesis	—	that	the	magnitude	of	crowd‐out	did	not	decrease	with	output	—	and	reject	the	
hypothesis	at	p	=	0.07.	This	decrease	in	crowd‐out	offers	qualitatively	new,	and	statistically	significant,	
support	for	the	impure	altruism	model.15	
	
Column	6	presents	estimates	of	unfunded	crowd‐out.	Recall	that	impure	altruism	predicts	that	as	output	
increases,	the	marginal	motive	for	giving	will	shift	away	from	altruism	toward	warm‐glow	and	unfunded	
crowd‐out	 will	 decrease.	 The	 interaction	 term	 indicates	 that	 unfunded	 crowd‐out	 is	 22	 percentage	
points	smaller	at	the	high	level	of	giving‐by‐others,	and	the	hypothesis	that	it	did	not	decrease	is	rejected	
(p	=	0.013).	Thus,	the	change	in	unfunded	crowd‐out	is	also	consistent	with	a	model	of	impure	altruism.	
16,17		
	
In	summary,	the	reduced‐form	results	—	that	crowd‐out	is	not	complete	and	that	both	crowd‐out	and	
unfunded	crowd‐out	decrease	with	output	—	demonstrate	that	on	average	participants	are	motivated	
by	impure	altruism.		
	
4.2.	A	structural	model:	The	relative	concern	for	altruism	and	warm‐glow	
	
To	investigate	the	relative	strength	of	warm‐glow	and	altruism,	this	section	demonstrates	how	one	can	
structurally	estimate	the	parameters	of	the	Cobb‐Douglas	impure	altruism	utility	function	from	equation	
(1).	The	optimal	gift	gib*	derived	from	this	utility	function	is:		
	
gib*		=			½	[(1	−	β)	G‐i,b		+		(α	+	β)	Zib		+	{[(1	−	β)	G‐i,b	+	(α	+	β)	Zib	]2	−	4	α	G‐i,b	Zib	}½	]		 (2)	
−	G‐i,b		+	ei		+		uib	
	
                                                          
15	Comparing	the	estimates	of	crowd‐out	from	column	5	with	the	estimates	from	columns	3	and	4	indicates	slight	
differences	 that	 are	 due	 to	 the	 nonlinear	 estimation	 method:	 the	 nonlinear	 method	 applied	 to	 two	 separate	
samples	(columns	3	and	4)	generates	slightly	different	estimates	than	the	nonlinear	method	applied	to	the	two	
samples	combined	into	a	single	model	with	an	interaction	term	(column	5).	Estimates	from	the	linear	model	are,	
of	course,	identical	whether	generated	using	separate	samples	or	one	combined	sample	with	an	interaction	term.	
Random	 effects	 Tobit	 estimation,	 an	 alternative	 approach	 to	 account	 for	 the	 corners	 under	 the	 additional	
assumption	that	the	errors	are	normally	distributed	(which	they	approximately	are),	produces	results	similar	to	
the	two‐sided	individual	fixed	effects	censored	estimates	presented	in	Table	2.	
16	A	subtle	point	is	that	in	a	pure	altruism	model,	unfunded	crowd‐out	varies	with	output	if	the	own	income	effect	
varies	with	output.	However,	estimates	from	the	linear	fixed‐effects	model	show	that	the	own	income	effects	are	
.40	 and	 .41	 at	 the	 low	and	high	 levels	 of	 giving‐by‐others.	 The	 two‐sided	 fixed	 effects	 censored	 estimates	 are	
slightly	smaller	(.32	and	.36);	the	hypothesis	that	the	two	income	effects	are	the	same	cannot	be	rejected	(p	=	.583).	
Hence,	in	our	setting	the	own	income	effect	is	essentially	constant,	and	with	the	own	income	effect	constant,	pure	
altruism	predicts	that	unfunded	crowd‐out	will	not	change	as	output	increases.	
17	The	zero	unfunded	crowd‐out	prediction	of	pure	warm‐glow	is	rejected	at	both	the	low	and	the	high	level	of	
giving‐by‐others	(ps	<	.001).	
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where	i	=	1,...,85	indexes	the	participants,	b	=	1,...,6	indexes	the	six	decisions	each	participant	faces	with	
corresponding	budgets	of	giving‐by‐others	and	own	income,	Zib	≡	wib	+	G‐i,b,		ei	is	an	individual‐specific	
random	 effect,	 and	 uib	 is	 the	 randomness	 in	 each	 participant’s	 giving	 that	 is	 not	 correlated	 across	
decisions.	Using	the	data	 from	all	85	participants	to	estimate	the	two	parameters	α	 (altruism)	and	β	
(warm‐glow)	we	first	use	a	representative‐agent	approach.	
	
Estimation	of	(2)	presents	three	econometric	problems:	non‐linearity	 in	the	parameters	α	and	β,	 the	
within‐participant	correlation	in	random	departures	of	giving	from	the	Cobb‐Douglas	specification	(the	
random	effect	ei),	and	the	corner	decisions	that	can	occur	at	$0	and	at	two	different	upper	amounts,	$40	
and	$46.	To	handle	these	challenges	simultaneously,	we	construct	a	non‐linear	random	effects	Tobit	
estimator	permitting	both	lower	and	upper	corner	solutions,	and	use	it	to	estimate	(2).18	
	
Table	3	reports	the	estimates.		Consistent	with	our	crowd‐out	results,	the	significant	coefficients	on	both	
α	and	β	reveal	that	individuals	are	motivated	both	by	altruism	and	warm‐glow.	The	0.021	estimate	on	
the	warm‐glow	component	 is	significantly	greater	 than	zero,	 implying	rejection	of	 the	pure	altruism	
model.	However,	 the	warm‐glow	component	 is	 relatively	small.	With	 the	estimate	on	altruism	being	
0.594,	the	weight	placed	on	warm‐glow	relative	to	overall	generosity,	α+β,	is	0.034	(β/α+β).19	The	0.902	
estimate	of	the	correlation	coefficient	ρ	indicates	that	there	is	substantial	heterogeneity	in	participants’	
random	deviations	 from	 the	Cobb‐Douglas	model.	Next	we	 look	at	 individual	 choices	 to	 explore	 the	
heterogeneity	across	participants	in	their	α	and	β	parameter	values.		
	
Table	3.	Estimated	Representative‐Agent	Cobb‐Douglas	preferences	
	 	
	 Coefficient	 Standard	error	
p‐value	
α	 0.594		 0.025	 0.000	
β	 0.021	 0.009	 0.022	
ρ	 0.902	 0.016	 0.000	
	 	 Notes:	Non‐linear	random	effects	Tobit	estimates	of	(2).	ρ	is	the	correlation		
coefficient	of	the	error	term	across	decisions	within‐individuals.	The	log‐	
likelihood	is	–1466.9.	N	=	85	participants,	six	decisions	per	participant.	
	
                                                          
18	Estimates	of	α	and	β	are	calculated	using	maximum	likelihood,	assuming	that	uib	and	ei	are	normally	distributed.	
To	 calculate	 the	multivariate	normal	probabilities	when	gib	 =	0	 and	when	gib	 =	wib	we	use	 STATA’s	maximum	
simulated	 likelihood	 routines	 (Cappellari	 and	 Jenkins	 2006),	 adapting	 Barslund’s	 (2007)	 multivariate	 Tobit	
program.	
19	At	first	it	may	seem	that	the	large	weight	placed	on	altruism	results	from	the	economy	being	‘small’	in	the	sense	
of	Andreoni	(1988)	and	Ribar	and	Wilhelm	(2002).	However,	this	conclusion	incorrectly	applies	intuition	gained	
from	thinking	about	motives	at	the	margin	(q1	and	q2)	to	motives	as	preference	parameters	(i.e.,	α	and	β).	Inference	
on	preference	parameters	is	drawn	from	the	change	in	crowd‐out.	Once	the	preference	parameters	are	known,	
what	defines	an	economy	as	‘small’	and	‘large,’	in	the	sense	that	the	marginal	motive	shifts	from	primarily	altruism	
to	solely	warm‐glow,	depends	on	the	level	of	giving‐by‐others	to	the	charitable	cause.	In	the	case	of	donating	books	
to	a	fire‐victim	child,	the	estimates	in	Table	3	imply	that,	with	wi	=	$40,	the	economy	becomes	large	in	the	sense	
that	the	marginal	motive	for	giving	only	is	warm‐glow	(q1	+	q2	≈	1)	when	the	amount	given	by	others	surpasses	
$61.71.	
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Our	 within‐subject	 design	 allows	 us	 to	 estimate	 for	 each	 individual	 the	 altruism	 and	 warm‐glow	
parameters	in	equation	(2)	using	maximum	likelihood	Tobit,	with	the	parameter	estimates	constrained	
such	that	αi,	βi,	∈	[0,1].	Binding	constraints	indicate	pure	altruism	(0	<	αi	<	1,		βi		=	0)	or	pure	warm‐glow	
(αi		=	0,	0	<		βi		<	1).	Figure	2	is	a	scatter	diagram	presenting	the	distribution	of	the	altruism	and	warm‐
glow	 preference	 parameters.	 The	 magnitude	 of	 altruism	 is	 shown	 along	 the	 vertical	 axis,	 and	 the	
magnitude	of	warm‐glow	along	the	horizontal	axis.	Points	on	the	vertical	axis	represent	participants	
motivated	 by	 pure	 altruism,	 points	 in	 the	 interior	 represent	 individuals	 whose	 donations	 were	
motivated	by	impure	altruism,	and	points	on	the	horizontal	axis	represent	participants	motivated	by	
pure	warm‐glow.	Donations	were	 for	 the	majority	 of	 participants	motivated	 by	pure	 altruism	 (43.5	
percent;	N	=	37)	or	by	impure	altruism	(38.8	percent;	N	=	33).	Nine	percent	(N	=	8)	were	motivated	only	
by	warm‐glow.	Among	those	motivated	by	impure	altruism,	most	attach	a	greater	weight	to	altruism	
than	to	warm‐glow:	there	are	only	two	participants	with	αi	≈	βi,	and	only	five	with	αi		<		βi.	20	The	relative	
concern	for	warm‐glow	from	the	individual‐specific	approach	can	be	evaluated	by	looking	at	the	median	
or	mean	of	the	individual	weights	placed	on	warm‐glow	(βi/αi+	βi).	The	median	and	mean	weight	on	
warm‐glow	are	is	0.026	and	0.211,	respectively.	21	
	 	
                                                          
20	One	of	these	five	has	αi	 just	a	little	above	zero	and	βi	=	.5,	and	in	Figure	2	is	indistinguishable	from	two	pure	
warm‐glow	participants	who	have	αi	=	0	and	βi	=	.5.	Estimates	of	αi	and	βi	cannot	be	obtained	for	the	six	participants	
who	chose	corner	solutions	for	all	six	of	their	decisions,	and	for	a	seventh	participant	who	chose	the	upper	corner	
for	four	decisions	and	was	close	to	the	upper	corner	for	two	other	decisions.	
21	Whether	one	uses	the	representative‐agent	or	individual‐specific	approach	for	estimating	preferences	depends	
on	 the	question	at	hand.	The	 individual‐specific	approach	provides	more	accurate	 individual‐level	predictions,	
while	the	representative‐agent	approach	provides	a	more	accurate	prediction	of	contributions	at	the	level	of	each	
of	the	six	budgets.	The	root‐mean	square	error	of	the	crowd‐out	predictions	across	the	six	budgets	is	$0.78	from	
the	representative‐agent	approach	and	$0.99	from	the	individual‐specific	approach.	If	the	objective	is	to	predict	
the	response	to	policy	changes	—	such	as,	“How	much	will	the	average	response	be	to	a	change	in	government	
funding	(giving‐by‐others)?”	—	then	the	representative‐agent	approach	is	more	accurate. 
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Figure	2.	Estimated	individual‐specific	Cobb‐Douglas	preferences	(N	=	78).	
	
While	our	reduced‐form	analysis	makes	clear	that	 individuals	are	motivated	by	impure	altruism,	the	
representative‐agent	or	individual‐specific	structural	approach	is	needed	to	determine	the	relative	role	
played	by	altruism	and	warm‐glow.	For	the	type	of	charity	examined	here,	the	weight	placed	on	altruism	
is	much	larger	than	that	placed	on	warm‐glow.		
	
5.	Conclusion	
	
To	examine	motives	for	giving	the	extant	approach	is	to	position	pure	altruism	as	the	null	hypothesis,	
and	 to	 test	 its	 prediction	 of	 complete	 crowd‐out	 by	 measuring	 crowd‐out	 around	 a	 single	 level	 of	
charitable	 output.	 In	 rejecting	 complete	 crowd‐out,	 impure	 altruism	 has	 been	 accepted	 as	 the	
alternative.		
	
If	 impure	altruism	 is	 the	 “true”	model,	we	show	 that	one	crowd‐out	measurement	 is	 insufficient	 for	
inferring	 preferences	 for	 giving.	 Multiple	measurements	 of	 crowd‐out,	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 output,	
however	secure	identification.	The	reason	this	is	the	case	is	that	the	degree	of	crowd‐out	depends	on	
the	charity’s	output.	There	are	three	implications.	First,	the	power	to	reject	pure	altruism	depends	on	
the	level	of	output	where	it	is	tested.	Second,	a	single	measurement	of	crowd‐out	cannot	identify	the	
relative	 weight	 placed	 on	 altruism	 and	 warm‐glow	 preferences.	 In	 fact,	 a	 single	 measurement	 of	
incomplete	crowd‐out	is	consistent	not	only	with	impure	altruism,	but	also	with	pure	warm‐glow	giving.	
Third,	 multiple	 crowd‐out	 measurements	 permit	 a	 direct	 test	 of	 impure	 altruism.	 That	 is,	 impure	
altruism	can	be	positioned	as	the	null	hypothesis,	and	its	comparative‐static	prediction,	that	crowd‐out	
decreases	when	measured	at	higher	output	levels,	can	be	directly	tested.		
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An	advantage	of	 this	direct	 test	of	 impure	altruism	 is	 that	 it	 relies	on	a	 comparative	 static	 that	was	
unanticipated	at	the	time	the	model	was	proposed.	Although	continued	evidence	of	incomplete	crowd‐
out	is	a	necessary	criterion	for	the	model	to	pass,	evidence	of	decreasing	crowd‐out	is	needed	to	confirm	
a	novel	prediction	of	impure	altruism.		
	
Our	experimental	study	yields	three	empirical	contributions.	It	presents	the	first	evidence	that	inference	
on	 preferences	 can	 be	 misled	 by	 a	 single	 crowd‐out	 measurement.	 Second,	 it	 provides	 the	 first	
confirmation	 of	 the	 direct	 test	 of	 impure	 altruism:	 statistically	 significant	 evidence	 that	 crowd‐out	
decreases	with	 output.	 Third,	 it	 demonstrates	 how	 structural	 estimates	 of	 altruism	 and	warm‐glow	
preferences	can	be	inferred	with	multiple	measurements	of	crowd‐out.	
	
The central implication of our study is methodological: inference on preferences for giving requires 
more than one crowd-out measurement. This finding has implications for both experimental and non-
experimental studies. In lab and field experiments the change in output is secured by manipulating 
the amount given-by-others to an existing charity, and when using non-experimental data the change 
in output is secured by comparing different points in time over which charity funding changes. In 
measuring crowd-out around more than one output level, existing practice merely has to be extended 
to more than one change in output.  
	
Our	 finding	 that	 crowd‐out	 decreases	 is	 essential	 for	 understanding	 motives	 for	 giving	 and	 for	
interpreting	 existing	 crowd‐out	 estimates.	 Although	 there	 likely	 are	 several	 reasons	 why	 previous	
studies	have	generated	a	range	of	different	crowd‐out	estimates,	the	sensitivity	to	output	level	provides	
a	theoretically‐grounded	reason	for	the	differences.	Of	course,	another	explanation	for	the	varied	set	of	
crowd‐out	estimates	is	that	these	studies	examine	contributions	by	different	populations	to	different	
causes.	Much	as	for	demands	for	private	goods,	we	should	not	expect	that	preferences	for	contributing	
to	one	non‐profit	will	be	predictive	of	preferences	for	contributing	to	all	non‐profits.	In	our	setting,	we	
find	that	warm‐glow	is	weak	relative	to	altruism,	however	there	is	no	reason	to	expect	altruism	to	be	
equally	 important	 for	 all	 donations.	 	 The	 estimates	herein	may	be	 a	better	 indicator	 of	 the	 types	 of	
preferences	expected	for	donations	to	other	humanitarian	charities	—	similar	to	the	type	examined	in	
our	experiment,	while	a	poorer	indicator	of	preferences	for	giving	to,	say,	one’s	alma	mater.	Importantly,	
our	analysis	demonstrates	that	although	reduced‐form	results	point	to	warm‐glow	playing	a	statistically	
significant	role,	structural	estimates	are	needed	to	assess	the	relative	weight	placed	on	altruism	and	
warm‐glow.	
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Online	Appendix	A:		
Monotonically	decreasing	balanced‐budget	and	unfunded	crowd‐out.	
	
In	 this	 appendix	we	 derive	 three	 results.	 First,	 we	 derive	 sufficient	 conditions	 for	 balanced‐budget	
crowd‐out	( ୢ௚೔∗ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀିௗீష೔ሻ	to	be	monotonically	decreasing	in	giving‐by‐others.	Second,	we	show	that	
unfunded	 crowd‐out	 ( ୢ௚೔∗ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀ଴ሻ	 is	 monotonically	 decreasing	 with	 Cobb‐Douglas	 impure	 altruism.	
Third,	we	present	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	separable	impure	altruism	utility	functions	to	
have	monotonically	decreasing	unfunded	crowd‐out.	
Following	Andreoni	(1989)	an	impure	altruist’s	preferences	are	given	by	ܷሺݔ௜, ܩ, ݃௜ሻ,	where	xi	
denotes	private	consumption,	G	the	charity’s	output,	and	gi	i’s	gift	to	the	charity.	ܩ ൌ ∑ ݃௜௡௜ୀଵ 	is	the	sum	
of	 the	 charitable	 gifts,	 and	 ܩି௜ ൌ ∑ ݃௝௝ஷ௜ 	 the	 amount	 given‐by‐others.	 Normalizing	 prizes	 i’s	 budget	
constraint	is:	ݔ௜ ൅ ݃௜ ൑ ݓ௜,	where	wi	denotes	own	income.	Adding	ܩି௜	to	both	sides	the	budget	constraint	
can	be	re‐written	as:	ݔ௜ ൅ ܩ ൑ ݓ௜ ൅ ܩି௜.	Setting	݃௜ ൌ ܩ െ ܩ௜	the	resulting	first‐order	condition	equals:	
	 		
	
െܷ௫ሺݔ௜, ܩ, ܩ െ ܩି௜ሻ ൅ ܷீሺݔ௜, ܩ, ܩ െ ܩି௜ሻ ൅ ௚ܷ೔ሺݔ௜, ܩ, ܩ െ ܩି௜ሻ ൌ 0.	 	 	 (A.1)	
	
The	 Engel	 curve	 for	 the	 public	 good	 derived	 from	 the	 first‐order	 condition	 is	 a	 function	 of	 two	
arguments,	social	income	(ܼ௜ ൌ ݓ௜ ൅ ܩି௜ሻ	and	giving‐by‐others	(ܩି௜ሻ	
	
ܩ∗ ൌ ݍሺݓ௜ ൅ ܩି௜, ܩି௜ሻ		 	 	 	 	 	 (A.2)	
	
Thus	in	the	impure	altruism	model	the	response	to	a	change	in	own	income	dG*/dwi	≜	q1	does	not	equal	
that	seen	for	a	change	in	giving‐by‐others	dG*/dG‐i	≜	q1	+	q2.		q2	is	the	difference	between	the	two	effects	
=	dG*/dG‐i		−		dG*/dwi.				
Equation	(A.2)	implies:		
gi*	=	−G‐i	+	q(wi	+	G‐i,	G‐i)	 	 	 	
	
and	
dgi*	=	−dG‐i	+	q1[dwi	+	dG‐i]	 +		q2	dG‐i	 	 	
	
Thus	 balanced‐budget	 crowd‐out	 equals	 ୢ௚೔∗ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀିௗீష೔ ൌ െ1 ൅ ݍଶ.	 	 A	 one	 dollar	 decrease	 in	 own	
income	accompanied	by	a	one	dollar	increase	in	the	giving‐by‐others	increases	i’s	preferred	provision	
of	the	public	good	by	the	amount	q2.		
	 If	q1	>	0,	q2	>	0	and	q1	+	q2	<	1,	then	at	the	margin	both	altruism	and	warm‐glow	influence	giving.	
The	model	reduces	to	the	pure	altruism	model	if	q1	>	0	and	q2	=	0,	and	it	reduces	to	a	model	of	pure	
warm‐glow	model	if	i’s	preferred	level	of	the	public	good	increases	dollar‐for‐dollar	with	the	unfunded	
amount	provided	by	others:	dG*/dG‐i	ൌ	q1	+	q2	=	1;	hence,	if	individuals	are	motivated	at	the	margin	by	
warm‐glow	only	 (no	altruism),	crowd‐out	 in	response	 to	an	unfunded	 increase	 in	G‐i	 is	 ୢ௚೔
∗
ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀ଴ ൌ
െ1 ൅	ݍଵ ൅	ݍଶ ൌ 0.	
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Examining	the	 impure	altruism	model	Ribar	and	Wilhelm	(2002)	show	that	although	impure	
altruists	 are	predicted	 to	 respond	 to	 changes	 in	 giving	 by	others,	 unfunded	 crowd‐out	 ୢ௚೔∗ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀ଴ ൌ
െ1 ൅	ݍଵ ൅	ݍଶ ൏ 0,	 this	 prediction	 does	 not	 hold	 in	 the	 limit.	 	 Rather,	 they	 show	 that	 under	 weak	
conditions	on	preferences	(concave	utility	and	strictly	operative	warm‐glow	at	all	levels	of	G)	as	giving‐
by‐others	G‐i	→	∞	⇒	q1	+	q2	→	1.	Hence,	 ୢ௚೔
∗
ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀ଴→	0	as	G‐i	→	∞.	That	is,	the	impure	altruism	model	
converges	to	a	model	where,	at	the	margin,	giving	is	motived	only	by	pure	warm‐glow.22	
To	obtain	a	comparative	static	from	the	impure	altruism	model	that	is	testable	in	an	experiment,	
we	need	to	secure	that	the	associated	shift	in	the	marginal	preferences	from	impure	altruism	to	warm‐
glow	is	monotonic.	We	begin	by	showing	sufficient	conditions	on	preferences	to	secure	that	balanced‐
budget	crowd‐out	is	monotonically	decreasing.		
				
PROPOSITION	1.	Consider	a	concave	impurely	altruistic	utility	function,	with	strictly	operative	warm‐glow,	
and	 that	 satisfies	 the	 technical	 conditions	 described	 in	 footnote	 22.	 Further,	 if	 utility	 is	 additively	
separable	with	positive	third	derivatives,	then	q2	is	monotonically	increasing	in	G‐i.23	
	
Proof:	Differentiating	the	first‐order	condition	(A.1)	with	respect	to	G‐i	yields:	
	
q2	=	(UgG	+	Ugg		−	Ugx)	/	(Uxx	+	Ugg	+	UGG	−2	UGx	−2	Ugx	+2	UgG)								 	 	 (A.3)	
	
which	for	additively	separable	utility	functions	reduces	to:	
	
	 	 	 q2	=	Ugg	/	(Uxx	+	Ugg	+	UGG).								 	 	 	 	 	 (A.4)	
	
Differentiating	the	second	derivatives	with	respect	to	G‐i	yields:	
	
ௗ௎ೣೣ
ௗீష೔ ൌ 	ܷ௫௫௫
ௗ௫∗
ௗீష೔ ൌ ܷ௫௫௫	ሺ1 െ	ݍଵ 	െ	ݍଶሻ ൐ 0	 	 	 	 	 (A.5)	
	
ௗ௎ಸಸ
ௗீష೔ ൌ 	ܷீீீ
ௗீ∗
ௗீష೔ ൌ ܷீீீ	ሺݍଵ ൅ ݍଶሻ ൐ 0	 	 	 	 	 (A.6)	
	
ௗ௎೒೒
ௗீష೔ ൌ 	 ௚ܷ௚௚
ௗ௚∗
ௗீష೔ ൌ ௚ܷ௚௚	ሺݍଵ ൅ ݍଶ െ 1ሻ ൏ 0	 	 	 	 	 (A.7)	
	
where	 the	 inequalities	 follow	 from	 the	assumed	positive	 third	derivatives.	Now	differentiating	 (A.4)	
with	respect	to	G‐i:	
	
                                                          
22	In	addition	there	are	several	technical	conditions:	utility	is	twice	continuously	differentiable,	has	strictly	positive	
first	derivatives,	UG	is	finite	for	all	gi	>	0,	the	second	derivatives	of	U(.,.,.)	with	respect	to	the	two	private	goods	xi	
and	gi	are	finite	for	all	levels	of	G,	and	Uxx	−	2Uxg	+	Ugg	is	bounded	away	from	zero	(again,	for	all	levels	of	G).	The	
assumption	that	warm‐glow	is	operative	also	is	needed	to	secure	that	the	impure	altruism	model,	in	contrast	to	
the	pure	altruism	model,	can	predict	individual	giving	in	a	large	economy	(Andreoni,	1989).	As	in	Andreoni	(1989)	
it	is	also	assumed	that	the	giving‐by‐others	is	addressing	a	need,	through	the	charity,	that	itself	remains	constant.	
23	 In	 the	analysis	of	 risk,	a	positive	 third	derivative	corresponds	 to	prudence,	which	can	be	 interpreted	as	 the	
disutility	of	being	faced	with	a	specified	risk	decreasing	as	wealth	gets	higher	(Eeckhoudt	and	Schlesinger,	2006).	
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ௗ௤మ
ௗீష೔ ൌ 	
೏ೆ೒೒
೏ಸష೔
ሺ௎ೣೣ	ା	௎ಸಸሻ	ି	௎೒೒	൬೏ೆೣೣ೏ಸష೔ା	
೏ೆಸಸ
೏ಸష೔ ൰	
ሺ௎ೣೣ	ା	௎ಸಸ	ା	௎೒೒ሻమ .	 	 	 	 	 (A.8)	
	
Concavity	combined	with	the	signs	in	(A.5)–(A.7)	imply	that	 ௗ௤మௗீష೔	is	positive.█	
	
Monotonically	 decreasing	 balanced‐budget	 crowd‐out	 secures	 a	 testable	 prediction	 of	 the	
impure	altruism,	because	monotonicity	implies	balanced‐budget	crowd‐out	decreases	when	increasing	
G‐i	between	any	two	finite	levels		ܩି௜௅௢௪		and		ܩି௜ு௜௚௛.	Cobb‐Douglas	preferences	meet	the	conditions	in	
Proposition	1,	thus	securing	decreasing	balanced‐budget	crowd‐out	as	shown	in	Figure	1.	
For	Cobb‐Douglas	preferences	we	can	also	show	our	second	result.		Namely	that	Cobb‐Douglas	
preferences	also	have	monotonically	decreasing	unfunded	crowd‐out	( ୢ௚೔∗ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀ଴ → 0),	and	presents	a	
set	of	 conditions	on	preferences	such	 that	decreasing	unfunded	crowd‐out	 is	monotonic—hence	 the	
marginal	motive	for	giving	monotonically	moves	from	impure	altruism	to	warm‐glow	(ݍଵ ൅	ݍଶ → 1	).	
For	the	Cobb‐Douglas	result	i’s	voluntary	contribution	is	given	by		
	
gi*		=		−	G‐i		+		½	[(1	−	β)	G‐i	+		(α	+	β)	Zi		+	{[(1	−	β)	G‐i	+	(α	+	β)	Zi	]2	−	4	α	G‐iZi	}½	]	.	 	 (A.9)	
	
Differentiating	with	respect	to	G‐i	to	get	unfunded	crowd‐out	 ୢ௚೔
∗
ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀ଴	=	−	1	+	q1	+	q2,	yields:	
	
ݍଵ ൅	ݍଶ ൌ 	 ଵଶ ቂ1 ൅ 	ߙ ൅
ே
ௌభ మൗ ቃ	 	 	 	 	 (A.10)	
	
where:	
	 	 	 ܰ ≡ ሺ1 െ ߙሻଶܩି௜ ൅ ሾሺߚ െ ߙሻ ൅ ሺߙ ൅ ߚሻߙሿݓ௜	 	 	 	 (A.11)	
	
	 	 ܵ ≡ ሺ1 െ ߙሻଶܩି௜ଶ ൅ 2ሾሺߚ െ ߙሻ ൅ ሺߙ ൅ ߚሻߙሿܩି௜ݓ௜ ൅ ሺߙ ൅ ߚሻଶݓ௜ଶ.	 	 (A.12)		
	
Differentiating	(A.10)	with	respect	to	G‐i	indicates	that:	
	
	ݏ݅݃݊ ቂௗሺ௤భା௤మሻௗீష೔ ቃ ൌ ݏ݅݃݊ ቂܵ
ௗே
ௗீష೔ െ ܰሺ
ଵ
ଶሻ
ௗௌ
ௗீష೔ቃ	 	 	 	 (A.13)	
	
Noting	that	 ௗேௗீష೔ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
ଶ	and	 ௗௌௗீష೔ ൌ 2ܰ,	the	term	in	square	brackets	on	the	right‐hand	side	of	(A.13)	
reduces	to	ܵሺ1 െ ߙሻଶ െ ܰଶ,	and	(A.11)	and	(A.12)	used	to	show:	
	
	 	 ܵሺ1 െ ߙሻଶ െ ܰଶ ൌ 	 ሼሺߙ ൅ ߚሻଶሺ1 െ ߙሻଶ െ ሾሺߚ െ ߙሻ ൅ ሺߙ ൅ ߚሻߙሿଶሽݓ௜ଶ	
(A.14)	
ൌ 	4ߙߚሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻݓ௜ଶ	
	
If	(and	only	if)	α	+	β	<	1,	α	>	0,	and	β	>	0,	the	right‐hand	side	of	(A.14)	is	strictly	positive,	implying	ௗሺ௤భା௤మሻௗீష೔ 	
is	positive	and	 ୢ௚೔∗ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀ଴		monotonically	decreases	as	G‐i		increases.	█	
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PROPOSITION	2.	Consider	a	concave	impurely	altruistic	utility	function,	with	strictly	operative	warm‐glow,	
that	satisfies	the	technical	conditions	described	in	footnote	22,	and	further	is	additively	separable.	q1	+	
q2	is	monotonically	increasing	in	G‐i	if	and	only	if		௎ಸಸಸ௎ಸಸమ ൐ 	
௎ೣೣೣି௎೒೒೒
൫௎ೣೣ	ା	௎೒೒൯మ
	.	
	
Proof:	In	fashion	parallel	to	obtaining	equation	(A.3),	partially	differentiating	the	first‐order	condition	
(A.1)	with	respect	to	social	income	Zi	yields:	
	
q1	=	(Uxx	−	UxG		−	Uxg)	/	(Uxx	+	Ugg	+	UGG	−2	UGx	−2	Ugx	+2	UgG)									 	 	 (A.15)	
	
which	for	additively	separable	utility	functions	reduces	to:	
	
	 	 	 q1	=	Uxx	/	(Uxx	+	Ugg	+	UGG),									 	 	 	 	 	 (A.16)	
	
which	adding	to	(A.4):	
	
q1	+	q2	=	(Uxx	+	Ugg)/	(Uxx	+	Ugg	+	UGG),									 	 	 	 	 (A.17)	
	
Differentiating	(A.17)	with	respect	to	G‐i:	
	
	ௗሺ௤భା	௤మሻௗீష೔ ൌ 	
	௎ಸಸ	൬೏ೆೣೣ೏ಸష೔ା	
೏ೆ೒೒
೏ಸష೔ ൰ି൫௎ೣೣ	ା	௎೒೒൯	
೏ೆಸಸ
೏ಸష೔ 	
ሺ௎ೣೣ	ା	௎ಸಸ	ା	௎೒೒ሻమ .	 	 	 	
	
Using	equations	(A.5)–(A.7),	the	numerator	of	the	right‐hand	side	reduces	to:	
	
ܰݑ݉݁ݎܽݐ݋ݎ ቊ݀ሺݍଵ ൅	ݍଶሻ݀ܩି௜ ቋ ൌ 	ܷீீ	൫ܷ௫௫௫ െ ௚ܷ௚௚൯ሺ1 െ ݍଵ െ ݍଶሻ െ ൫ܷ௫௫ 	൅	 ௚ܷ௚൯	ܷீீீሺݍଵ ൅ ݍଶሻ	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (A.18)	
	 	 	 	 ൌ 	 ଵ௎ೣೣ	ା	௎೒೒ା௎ಸಸ ቂܷீீ
ଶ ൫ܷ௫௫௫ െ ௚ܷ௚௚൯ െ ൫ܷ௫௫ 	൅ 	 ௚ܷ௚൯ଶܷீீீቃ.	
	
The	(A.18)	right‐hand	side	term	in	square	brackets	is	negative,	implying		ௗሺ௤భା	௤మሻௗீష೔ 	positive,	if	and	only	if		
௎ಸಸಸ
௎ಸಸమ ൐ 	
௎ೣೣೣି௎೒೒೒
൫௎ೣೣ	ା	௎೒೒൯మ
	.	█	
	
Remark:	Positive	third	derivatives	and	 ௚ܷ௚௚ ൐ ܷ௫௫௫	would	satisfy	the	condition	in	Proposition	2	and	
therefore	 lead	 to	 q1	 +	 q2	 monotonically	 increasing	 in	 G‐i.	 Positive	 third	 derivatives	 ensure	 that	 the	
(negative)	second	derivatives	monotonically	move	 toward	zero	as	G‐i	 increases.	That	combined	with	
௚ܷ௚௚ ൐ ܷ௫௫௫	ensures	that	the	second	derivative	with	respect	to	giving	moves	toward	zero	faster	than	
does	the	second	derivative	with	respect	to	own	consumption.	
	 	
23	
 
Online	Appendix	B:	Instructions	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Claim	Check____________	
	
Welcome	
	 	 	 	
Thank	you	for	agreeing	to	participate	in	our	study	on	decision	making.	There	are	two	parts	of	the	
study	today.		In	the	first	part	you	are	asked	to	make	six	decisions	and	in	the	second	part	you	are	asked	
to	fill	out	a	survey.	When	you	have	completed	your	decisions	we	will	randomly	select	one	of	your	six	
decisions	for	payment.	Your	total	payment	from	the	study	will	be	the	sum	of	the	payment	that	results	
from	your	decision	and	$5	for	showing	up	to	the	study.	The	entire	study	should	take	about	an	hour,	
and	at	the	end	you	will	be	paid	privately	and	in	cash.	A	research	foundation	has	provided	the	funds	for	
this	study.	
	
We	ask	that	you	do	not	speak	to	each	other	or	make	comments,	except	to	ask	questions	about	the	
procedures	of	the	study.		We	also	ask	that	you	do	not	discuss	the	procedures	of	the	study	with	others	
outside	this	room.		
	
Your	Identity	
	
Your	identity	is	secret.		You	will	never	be	asked	to	reveal	it	to	anyone	during	the	course	of	the	study.		
Your	name	will	never	be	associated	with	your	decisions	or	with	your	answers	on	the	survey.	Neither	
the	assistants	nor	the	other	participants	will	be	able	to	link	you	to	any	of	the	decisions	you	make.		In	
order	to	keep	your	decisions	private,	please	do	not	reveal	your	choices	to	any	other	participant.	
	
Claim	Check	
	
Attached	to	the	top	of	this	page	is	a	yellow	piece	of	paper	with	a	number	on	it.		This	is	your	Claim	
Check.		Each	participant	has	a	different	number.		We	use	claim	checks	to	maintain	secrecy	about	your	
decisions,	payment,	and	identity.	You	will	present	your	Claim	Check	to	an	assistant	at	the	end	of	the	
study	to	receive	your	cash	payment.	
	
Please	remove	your	claim	check	now,	and	put	it	in	a	safe	place.	
	
Decision	Tasks	
	
For	 the	 decision	 tasks	 you	 will	 be	 paired	 with	 a	 child	 in	 Southwestern	 Pennsylvania	 (Allegheny,	
Washington,	Greene,	and	Fayette	Counties).	The	child	 is	between	1	and	12	years	old,	and	the	child’s	
family	home	has	suffered	extensive	fire	damage.	Most	or	all	of	the	family’s	possessions	have	been	lost.	
For	each	of	your	decisions	you	will	be	given	an	amount	of	money	which	you	will	be	asked	to	allocate	
between	the	child	and	yourself.	The	money	allocated	towards	the	child	will	be	spent	on	children’s	books.	
These	books	will	be	distributed	to	the	child	by	the	American	Red	Cross	of	Southwestern	Pennsylvania,	
immediately	after	the	child	has	been	affected	by	a	severe	fire.	
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As	soon	as	a	fire	is	reported	in	Southwestern	Pennsylvania,	the	American	Red	Cross	is	contacted	and	
volunteers	are	dispatched	to	the	site.	They	help	the	affected	families	find	temporary	shelter,	provide	
them	with	clothing,	a	meal,	and	give	them	a	comfort	bag	with	essential	toiletries.	Each	day	an	average	of	
one	 family	 in	 Southwestern	 Pennsylvania	 experiences	 a	 severe	 fire.	 These	 families	 depend	 on	 the	
American	Red	Cross	 for	emergency	help	to	cope	with	the	sudden	loss	of	 their	home	and	belongings.	
Unfortunately	the	American	Red	Cross	only	has	funds	to	provide	these	families	with	the	bare	essentials,	
and	they	do	not	provide	any	“comfort”	items	for	the	children	of	the	affected	families.		
	
For	the	study	today	we	have	joined	the	American	Red	Cross	of	Southwestern	PA	to	collect	funds	to	buy	
books	for	the	affected	children.	In	each	of	the	six	decisions	you	will	be	given	an	amount	of	money	which	
you	are	asked	to	allocate	between	the	child	you	are	paired	with	and	yourself.	In	addition	the	foundation	
has	agreed	to	donate	a	fixed	amount	of	money	towards	the	child	independent	of	your	allocation.	Thus	
the	total	amount	to	be	spent	on	the	child	is	the	sum	of	the	foundation’s	fixed	donation	and	the	allocation	
you	make	to	the	child.	The	amount	of	money	that	you	can	allocate	between	the	child	and	you,	as	well	as	
the	foundation’s	fixed	donation	to	the	child,	will	vary	across	the	six	decisions.	
	
The	American	Red	Cross	will	use	the	funds	collected	from	your	allocation	and	that	of	the	foundation	to	
purchase	the	child	books.	Each	participant	in	this	study	is	paired	with	a	different	child.	If	you	choose	not	
to	allocate	any	funds	to	the	child,	then	the	money	to	be	spent	on	the	child	will	be	limited	to	the	research	
foundation’s	 fixed	donation.	Only	you	have	 the	opportunity	 to	allocate	additional	 funds	 to	 the	 child.	
Neither	the	American	Red	Cross	nor	any	other	donors	provide	books	to	the	child.	Your	decision	alone	
determines	how	much	will	be	spent	on	the	child.		
	
In	explaining	why	the	American	Red	Cross	is	seeking	funds	for	books,	their	Emergency	Preparedness	
Coordinator	Sandi	Wraith	states	“Children's	needs	are	often	overlooked	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	
a	disaster	because	everyone	is	concerned	primarily	with	putting	the	fire	out,	reaching	safety,	and	finding	
shelter,	food	and	clothing...just	the	basics	of	life.	So	many	times,	I've	seen	children	just	sitting	on	the	curb	
with	no	one	to	talk	to	about	what's	happening...for	this	reason	I've	found	trauma	recovery	experts	in	the	
community	to	work	with	us	to	train	our	volunteer	responders	in	how	to	address	children's	needs	at	the	
scene	of	a	disaster.......being	able	to	give	the	children	fun	and	distracting	books	will	provide	a	great	bridge	
for	our	volunteers	to	connect	with	kids	and	get	them	talking	about	what	they've	experienced.”	
	
Once	we	are	ready	to	proceed	to	the	decisions,	you	will	be	given	a	decision	folder	and	a	calculator.	The	
folder	contains	a	decision	task	with	six	decisions	on	it,	and	an	envelope.	For	each	decision	you	will	have	
to	enter	your	preferred	allocation.	If	you	wish	to	receive	a	receipt	from	the	American	Red	Cross	for	your	
allocation	to	the	child,	you	will	need	to	fill	out	the	acknowledgment	form.	Note	however	that	by	doing	
so	you	will	relinquish	your	anonymity.	If	you	wish	to	remain	anonymous,	 leave	the	acknowledgment	
form	blank.	When	you	have	completed	the	decision	form	please	place	it	in	the	envelope	along	with	the	
acknowledgment	form,	instructions	and	the	calculator.		
		
When	we	have	collected	all	the	envelopes	we	will	draw	a	number	between	1	and	6	to	determine	which	
one	 of	 the	 decisions	 counts	 for	 payment.	 Since	 one	 decision	 is	 randomly	 selected	 for	 payment,	 you	
should	be	making	your	decision	as	if	every	decision	counts.	
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Sample	Decisions	
	
Here	is	an	example	of	the	type	of	decision	you	will	have	to	make.	This	is	just	an	example	to	demonstrate	
how	everything	is	calculated.	The	example	is	not	meant	to	guide	your	decision	in	any	way.		On	the	actual	
decision	sheets	we	want	you	to	select	the	allocation	that	you	like	best.		
	
Example:	You	have	been	given	$20	to	allocate	between	the	child	and	yourself.	The	research	foundation’s	
fixed	donation	towards	the	child	is	$5.	You	must	choose	how	much	money	to	allocate	towards	the	child	
and	yourself.	
	
You	may	choose	to	allocate	nothing	towards	the	child’s	books	and	$20	to	yourself.	 If	 this	decision	 is	
selected	for	payment	the	foundation’s	fixed	donation	of	$5	is	spent	on	the	child	and	your	payment	from	
the	decision	will	be	$20.	
	
Alternatively	you	may	choose	to	allocate	$20	towards	the	child	and	nothing	to	yourself.	The	money	to	
be	spent	on	the	child’s	books	will	be	$20+$5	=	$25,	and	your	payment	from	the	decision	is	$0.	
	
Finally,	you	may	choose	to	allocate	any	amount	between	$0	and	$20	to	the	child	and	the	remainder	to	
yourself.	Suppose	you	choose	to	allocate	$8	towards	the	child	and	$12	to	yourself.	If	selected	for	payment	
the	American	Red	Cross	will	receive	$8+$5	=	$13	to	spend	on	the	child’s	books	and	your	payment	for	
the	decision	will	be	$12.	
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Monitor	Role	
	
To	verify	that	all	the	procedures	of	this	study	are	followed	we	will	select	a	participant	to	be	the	monitor	
of	 the	 study.	 If	 your	Claim	Check	number	 is	 8	 you	will	 be	 the	monitor.	 The	monitor	will	 follow	 the	
assistants	around	to	see	that	everything	takes	place	as	explained	in	these	instructions.	The	monitor	will	
receive	a	fixed	payment	for	his	or	her	time.		
	
Once	 all	 decision	 forms	 have	 been	 collected	 all	 participants	 will	 be	 given	 a	 survey.	 While	 you	 are	
completing	the	survey	the	monitor	will	walk	with	two	assistants	to	a	separate	room	to	oversee	that	the	
calculation	 of	 the	 funds	 for	 the	 child	 and	 you	 are	 performed	 as	 described	 in	 the	 instructions.	 Your	
payment	will	be	placed	along	with	a	receipt	in	an	envelope	that	has	your	claim	check	number	on	the	face	
of	it.	The	assistant	will	make	out	a	check	to	the	American	Red	Cross	of	Southwestern	PA		for	the	amount	
corresponding	to	the	funds	for	the	child	determined	by	your	allocation.	One	check	will	be	made	out	for	
each	child.	This	check	as	well	as	any	relevant	acknowledgment	form	will	be	placed	in	an	addressed	and	
stamped	envelope	to	the	American	Red	Cross.	Once	all	the	calculations	have	been	completed	an	assistant	
will	walk	the	monitor	back	to	this	room.		A	box	of	envelopes	with	your	payments	will	be	given	to	an	
assistant	who	has	not	seen	your	decision	sheets.	The	monitor	will	then	make	a	statement	to	you	on	the	
extent	 to	 which	 the	 instructions	 were	 followed	 as	 described	 in	 the	 instructions.	 Once	 you	 have	
completed	your	survey	you	may	come	to	the	front	to	collect	your	payment	by	showing	your	claim	check.		
An	assistant	who	has	not	seen	your	decision	form	will	hand	you	the	sealed	envelope	with	your	payment.			
	
After	the	study	is	completed	the	monitor	and	an	assistant	will	walk	to	the	nearest	mailbox	(on	Forbes	
next	to	the	Hillman	Library)	where	the	monitor	will	drop	the	envelope	in	the	mailbox.	To	prove	that	all	
procedures	are	followed	the	monitor	will	be	asked	to	sign	a	certificate	to	that	effect.	This	certificate	will	
be	posted	outside	4916	Posvar	Hall.	
	
Upon	receipt	of	the	check	and	acknowledgment	form	the	American	Red	Cross	will	send	a	letter	affirming	
that	the	check	has	been	used	to	buy	books	for	the	child	according	to	the	description	above.	This	letter	
will	be	posted	outside	4916	Posvar	Hall.	
	
If	you	are	the	monitor	of	this	study	please	identify	yourself	by	coming	to	the	front	of	the	room	now.	
	
If	you	have	any	questions	about	the	procedures,	please	raise	your	hand	now	and	one	of	us	will	come	to	
your	seat	to	answer	your	question.	
	
Before	we	proceed	to	the	decision	task	we	want	you	to	complete	a	brief	quiz,	to	make	sure	you	know	
how	everything	will	be	calculated.	
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